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CASES AND MATERIALS ON RIGHTS IN LAND. By Oliver S. Rundell. Chicago:
Callaghan and Companr, 1941. Pp. xii, 674. $6.00.
Tis smallish volume in an expanding field shows the craftsman's touch
within its chosen purpose. It follows tie traditional division of Property
as originally fashioned by John C. Gray and followed in many law schools
and casebooks since. Among these Dean Bigelow's Cases on Rights in Land
has always been popular. I had the honor of reviewing the first edition
of Bigelow more years ago than I like to remember 1(1920) 29 YALe L. J.
477], it is interesting to see how much of what I there said could be
repeated here. For the present volume takes the subject much as the older
books plotted it out- with some few eliminations of topics, such as public
rights and the traditional historical introduction to land law--and brings
it down to date in ways which Gray would have found fitting and proper.
Here are the new decisions, the recent and pending Restatements, much of
the new law review material. The work is therefore up to the minute, and
yet it is a boon to teachers and curriculum fashioners in that it is briefer
than other books on what we always called "Property II." For Personal
Property, that conglomeration of leftovers from Sales and Torts, was
Property I, and the topics of conveyances, tiles, estates, and future interests
came later, with their own appropriate Roman numbers. Property II is
slightly conglomerate itself; it deals with "Possessory Interests" -earth, air,
land, and water- subjects which the restaters have relegated to "Torts,"
and with "Interests in the Land of Another," which is, aptly enough, to be
restated by "the Property II group." Nevertheless, this arrangement of
subject matter has survived in most law schools; and they need up-to-date
books as tools of the trade. Hence, this new volume amply justifies itself.
Moreover, there is a lot of developing interest in these topics, and so far
as private land law goes, full advantage has been taken of it here. From
his position as reporter of the pending restatement of Property II, the editor
is familiar with the ideas and purposes of that work. That, together with
Dean Fraser's "Torts" Restatement of the possessory interests, furnishes
the main basis of departure for all the topics as yet wholly or partially
restated. And it is a good jumping-off point- particularly the editor's own
work of restatement which contains an unusual number of trial balloons,
refreshing, indeed, if a bit unusual, in a supposed mere recording of existing
law. Such, for example, is die division of easements in gross into the cate-
gories of commercial and non-commercial easements, which represents a
valiant attempt to cut the Gordian knot of assignability vcl von by a new
christening to furnish a new dichotomy. His forthcoming restatement of
running covenants, somewhat foreshadowed herein, will, it seems, have its
goodly share of new condiments. All this makes for pleasant, vigorous dis-
cussion in an attractive teaching field.
Again, several innovations of detail will interest property teachers. Per-
haps the most striking is the treatment of Rights Respecting the Use of
Land Arising by Contract or Agreements, which covers die field traditionally
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divided between "covenants running with the land" and "equitable restric-
tions." Here the editor has eliminated consideration of leasehold covenants,
leaving them to the law of landlord and tenant, while he considers the real-
covenant and equitable-restriction cases as a single subject matter under
various topics such as intent of the parties, privity, "touching" and "con-
cerning," and so on, rather than as separate and isolated phenomena. I
suspect quite a few will dislike this treatment; on the whole it seems to me
sound and workable. Personally, I would be disposed to pick a bone or
two with the editor on some other points where we have pleasantly dis-
agreed previously, such as the summary treatment of the usual rule of non-
assignability of easements in gross, or a like brusque disposition of the
modern English rule of licenses in theatre-ticket cases, though rather ex-
tensive consideration is devoted to the traditional cases. But these are ques-
tions of taste and predilections, and the material is in any event sufficient
so that an instructor can take off in any and all directions he wishes. I like,
too, various details as to arrangement, such as the chapter introductory notes,
which at least suggest aim, direction, and purpose to the wondering student.
Clear and readable type, attractive page, and a brief workable index are
joys. All in all, one can confidently expect ready acceptance of this as a
workable trade tool.
Of course there may be some doubters, such as Professor McDougal of
Yale, who feel that this traditional arrangement of property teaching serves
to emphasize the by-waters of the law, rather than the rushing stream, if
not the wave, of the future. The editor does not yield an inch to such critics;
he leaves all matters of public housing, zoning, municipal planning, soil
erosion, drainage, irrigation, power, and other schemes quite undisturbed.
I will not quarrel with him for his plan and purpose. Students are waiting
to be taught, and teachers to teach; and while the McDougals are toying
with the law which is to come (to the law schools -maybe it is already
here so far as the courts are concerned), by all means let's give the others
the efficient helps required by their immediate purpose. I confess, however,
to a bit of surprise that not even a gesture of compromise towards the newer
trends was permitted. While the life of a compromiser is hard, since he
runs the risk of damnation from all sides, the middle way does have certain
advantages in law curricula development. The new materials are hard to
discover or create and to canalize into workable teaching materials, and,
unfortunately, the new thought course tends to be at first disorganized, diffuse,
and dull, rather than vigorous and virile as, theoretically, it should be. Until
it finds its sea legs it suffers by comparison with the older course, where
the teaching highlights have long been shrewdly exploited. And so a judicious
compromise of the new and the old may often help to break new ground
without too many or too serious birth pains. Hence, I should have thought
that a section, or at least a chapter, on new public controls in various types
of modern land development would have fitted in quite handily with the
editor's general scheme, as well as afforded an opportunity for a little worth-
while experimentation in pedagogy.
CHARLES E. CLARit
tJudge, Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
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STUDIES Ix FEDERAL TAXATION, T iau SERIES. By Randolph E. Paul.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, and London: Oxford University
Press, 1940. Pp. 539. $6.00.
CHANGES in the tax structure used to be made only once every two or
four years, but beginning with 1932 there has been a new major revenue
act each year, and in the last two years there have been two or more acts
a year. Taxes based on income, which in fiscal 1938 yielded about
$2,500,000,000, are now being called upon to yield over $9,000,000,000.
Except for the addition of a corporate excess profits tax, however, the
framework of the system has undergone no important change since 1939,
despite the fact that tax rates have increased in some instances as much
as 800 per cent. In the third series of Mr. Paul's studies of problems in
the field of federal taxation, the author discusses at length five matters
which for some time have been crying aloud for the intervention of the
legislature. A Congress which has had to devise an excess profits tax and
almost triple the yield of the tax system as a whole, all with a view to
selecting sources of revenue suitable for curbing inflation, stimulating the
defense program, and helping meet the increased costs of that program, could
spare little time to restitch the seams for a tax system which has grown
far too big for its breeches. Nevertheless, if the system is to continue to
have the cooperation of the taxpaying public, some way must be found for
current revenue legislation to deal with more than tax rates. As Mr. Paul
points out, a search for unattainable perfection is in time of crisis an excep-
tionally poor excuse for doing nothing.
Mr. Paul handles his subject matter with his customary breadth of vision.
His inexhaustible technical knowledge, his awareness of the broader impli-
cations of tax policy, and his impartiality of approach make for a book
which will stimulate the thinking of anyone possessing a basic knowledge
of the law of federal taxation.
The first and longest of this series of studies deals with corporate reor-
ganizations' and the host of unsolved problems which have arisen since
the reorganization provisions sprang almost fully armoured from the brow
of the Treasury in 1924.2 Among the problems which are discussed in
detail are: the unsatisfactory definition of "recapitalization" in determining
whether a transaction is or is not a reorganization; step transactions, the
continuity of interest theory and the refusal of the courts to extend the
reorganization sections to cases in which corporate property is transferred
to a subsidiary of the corporation issuing its stock in exchange therefor;
the latter day interpretations of Gregory v. Helvcring3 and the business pur-
pose doctrine; the indescribable confusion which once reigned on the subject
of assumptions of liabilities as a result of United States v. Hendlkr, now
mercifully ended by Section 213 of the 1939 Act; the effect of reorganiza-
1. Ixr. REv. CODE §§ 111, 112, 113, 115 (Supp. 1939).
2. Revenue Act of 1924, §§ 201-04 ind.
3. 293 U. S. 465 (1935).
4. 303 U. S. 564 (1938).
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tions upon earnings and profits as a result of Commissioner v. F. 1. Young
Corporaion,5 which has been tentatively set at rest by the amendments to
Section 115 of the Internal Revenue Code made in Section 501 of the
Second Revenue Act of 1940; and finally the tax effects of creditors' reor-
ganizations. This latter problem is perhaps the most vexing in the field.
As a result of Commissioner v. Kitselnan,6 the reorganization sections may
apply to deny losses and to preserve high and unreal bases for depreciation
where creditors of the old company become stockholders in the new. Fur-
thermore, there is considerable diversity of tax treatment between reor-
ganizations effected under the Bankruptcy Act9 and reorganizations accom-
plished in other ways. Congress made a tentative gesture in the 1939 Act
towards dealing with the tax effects of a discharge of indebtedness, but this
provision is not sufficiently comprehensive, leaves too many questions un-
answered, and is, in any event, only effective through 1942.
The reorganization sections had their heyday at a time when gains were
the rule and losses the exception. They bear every evidence of having
been drafted to meet conditions of increasing business prosperity and they
have come open at the seams when applied to depression conditions. In the
past twelve years no serious effort has been made to revamp them in the
light of a rapidly fluctuating economy, much less to re-examine the basic
philosophy of postponing until the indefinite future the taxation of appre-
ciation in the value of corporate property.
The second study deals with revocable trusts and the income tax. The
various devices in this field which have been concocted by sophisticated
taxpayers are reviewed in detail. There is a discussion and defense of the
famous Cliffords case. As Mr. Paul points out, few tears need be shed
over the fate of the taxpayer in that particular case. To make the argument
that the Court has destroyed certainty by buttressing the specific language
of Sections 166 and 167 of the Internal Revenue Code with the general
language of Section 22(a) ill becomes a taxpayer who is merely seeking
the certainty of a loophole. Nevertheless, it must be conceded that the
Court's approach may well trap many an innocent. Section 22(a) may
tell him what is income, but it will furnish no clue as to whose that income
is. If the satisfaction derived from the economic independence of those
near and dear may be income, there is scarcely an item which may not
be simultaneous income to all members of a family group. Legislation may
well be necessary on this account. As Mr. Paul suggests, the overwhelming
majority of problems of this nature could be permanently and equitably
solved by compelling joint returns to be filed by spouses not divorced or
separated. 9 Perhaps most of the residue could be eliminated by including
the income of dependent children in these returns.
5. 103 F. (2d) 137 (C.C.A. 3d, 1939).
6. 89 F. (2d) 458 (C.C.A. 7th, 1937), cert. denied, 302 U. S. 709 (1937).
7. BANKRUPTCY Acr (1938) §270, as amended by 54 STAT, 709 (1940), 11
U. S. C.A. § 670 (Supp. 1940).
8. Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U. S. 331 (1940).
9. Section 111 of the Revenue Bill of 1941, as reported by the Committee on
Ways and Means, contained such a provision but it was stricken out on the floor of
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More than fifty pages are devoted to the subject of alimony trusts. That
the Federal income tax law treats divorced wives with a chivalry beyond
all the bounds of reason, can scarcely be disputed by any but the bene-
ficiaries of that chivalry. Mr. Paul evidently feels so strongly on this point
that he is moved to defend the logic of the Fitch,10 Fuller," and Leoiiard -
cases as a limitation on Douglas v. Willcuts. 3 It may seriously be ques-
tioned, however, whether the interests of a uniform system of taxation are
best served by a doctrine which taxes a wife who is a beneficiary of an
alimony trust resulting from a Nevada divorce decree and taxes the income
of an identical trust to the husband where the divorce decree was obtained
in New York. One who is prepared to abolish the distinctions in the
taxation of husbands and wives between the eight community property
states and the forty non-community property states, is hard put to it to
defend the latest pronouncements of the Supreme Court on the subject of
alimony. It might also be pointed out that these decisions result in the
taxation of the wife if she must look exclusively to the trust for her alimony
payments and taxation of the husband where the wife has recourse to the
husband upon failure of the trust income. It would seem that the wife in
the latter situation has a far greater ability to pay than in the former.
Mr. Paul finally suggests, however, that all payments of alimony be taxed
to the wife and that appropriate deduction be made from the gross income
of the husband on account of such payments.' With this solution, there
can be little quarrel.
The third study deals with the limitless confusion with which mortgagors
and mortgagees must contend in computing their income taxes. Mr. Paul
has summarized the law on this subject and it would be fruitless to attempt
to resummarize it in the space of a paragraph. Should losses be deducted
at the time of foreclosure sale or voluntary transfer or abandonment, or
rather at the expiration of the period of redemption, or, in the case of the
mortgagee, when the property is finally disposed of? Are such losses capital
or ordinary or a combination of both? To what extent are gain or loss
and basis for depreciation governed by the bid price at foreclosure sale,
a price which is usually artificial and is always so in jurisdictions which
do not recognize an equity of redemption? The statute is silent, the regula-
tions15 illogical, and the decisions conflicting. The subject of foreclosures
and related transactions is another instance in which the revenue law has
conspicuously failed to deal with the problems of a depression period.
the House. H. R. 5417, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941). 71 Co.cn. REc., July 23, 1941,
at 6475.
10. Helvering v. Fitch, 309 U. S. 149 (1940).
11. Helvering v. Fuller, 310 U. S. 69 (1940).
12. Helvering v. Leonard, 310 U. S. 80 (1940).
13. 296 U. S. 1 (1935).
14. Section 117 of the Revenue Bill of 1941, as passed by the Senate, contained
such a provision but it was eliminated in Conference. . R. 5417, 77th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1941).
15. 1638 C. C. H. 1941 FED. TAx SFnV. V208, Reg. 103, §19.23(k)--3.
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The next study deals with the tax treatment of life insurance and annuities.
This field is still a fertile one for the ingenious. Mr. Paul very properly
questions whether the exemptions applicable10 to life insurance and annuities
should be allowed to continue in their present form in the case of combined
life insurance and annuity contracts. Such contracts are in reality a form
of investment rather than of protection for dependents. All too often they
are purchased with a single premium by uninsurable taxpayers who only
secure the contract by virtue of the insurance company's ability to hedge
the insurance risk by means of the annuity feature. This problem has arisen
most frequently in connection with the estate tax but there are also serious
income tax aspects, particularly in the case of certain forms of annuity
payments and dividends on fully paid-up life insurance policies.
The final chapter deals with the vexing question of the extent to which
the Commissioner may, without legislative authority, change regulations
once they are promulgated. In this connection, the Reynolds,17 Wilslire
Oil,18 and Hallock1 0 cases are discussed in detail. The last word on this
subject has doubtless yet to be spoken by the Supreme Court. The present
situation is one in which the Commissioner can never revise his interpre-
tations retroactively and in some cases may be prevented from doing so
prospectively. The Court, on the other hand, is free retroactively to
overturn its long-standing and almost hallowed constructions together with
administrative regulations based on those constructions. The result will
inevitably be that the Commissioner in his initial regulations must go the
limit in protecting the revenue, for fear that any less strict interpretation
will become frozen in the law despite changing circumstances. Taxpayers
may thus be able to rely on the immutable nature of his rulings except
in cases in which such reliance would seem to be most justified, that is,
where the ruling is merely a paraphrase of a Supreme Court decision. In
such cases the Commissioner and his counsel seem free to argue that the
regulations are erroneous. The problem of securing flexibility of admin-
istration while at the same time assuring the taxpayer that he is ordinarily
entitled to rely upon long-standing judicial and administrative interpreta-
tions is a difficult one. Mr. Paul suggests that possible abuse of the regulatory
power might be remedied by requiring public hearings upon all proposed
regulations to be issued under new sections of the statute. Unfortunately,
with two and three major revenue acts a year, the Bureau of Internal
Revenue is hard pressed enough to give taxpayers at least some indication
before the following March 15 as to how it proposes to interpret a new
provision. To require public hearings before the issuance of such regula-
tions does not seem administratively practicable. It is to be hoped that
the problem can be largely corrected at the source by the exercise of reason-
able restraint all 'round: by the Court in awaiting legislative cures of mis-
16. INT. Rzv. CODE § 22(b) (1) & (2) (income tax) and § 811(g) (estate tax)
(Supp. 1939).
17. Helvering v. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 306 U. S. 110 (1939).
18. Helvering v. Wilshire Oil Co., 308 U. S. 90 (1939).
19. Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U. S. 106 (1940).
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taken Supreme Court decisions, by the Treasury in a freer use of the puwers
conferred upon it by Section 3791 (b) of the Code to prescribe regulations
without retroactive effect, and by the Department of Justice in refraining
from contending that a regulation of the Commissioner is erroneous.
The subjects discussed by Mr. Paul are not ones which can safely le
consigned to the leisurely domain of academic speculation. They demand
immediate attempts at corrective measures and the higher tax rates rise,
the more acute will become the necessity for correction. The inequity of a
provision which operates unfairly against the taxpayer increases many fold
with each increase in rates. At the same time, it cannot too often be repeated
that a provision which unfairly discriminates in favor of some taxpavcrb
results inevitably in heavier burdens being placed upon the rest of the public,
and the greater the need for revenue the more onerous will these avoidable
burdens become. The greatest merit of Mr. Paul's very stimulating book
is to focus attention upon the urgency of facing and meeting this problem.
ROBERT B. EIciHoLzt
JURISPRUDENCE. By Edgar Bodenheimer. New York and London: McGraw
Hill Book Co. 1940. Pp. 357. $3.50.
TiE fermenting capsule of Bodenheimer's thought is the distinction be-
tween power and law which he identifies as the struggle between totalitarian-
ism and constitutionalism. Hitler's Reich represents a power despotism;
other states may approach an anarchy extreme, but there is an ideal mean
between the two in which "law" reigns. It is only when there are restraints
upon the powers of governmental officials (including judges) that we have,
in the author's view, a distinctively legal order.
The whole discussion is in the reahn of doctrinaire theorizing, the views
of various jurists being set out like so many dead insects stuck on pins.
Although its thesis is most easily understood as a refugee's reaction against
Germany's hell, the book is nonetheless steeped in the philosophic tradition
of German Idealism, without much grounding in empirical knowledge and
concrete situations. Such point as the book possesses derives from its protest
against tyranny, but the argument travels a long way 'round, taking us
through many a shifting landscape of juristic thought with a range which
is encyclopedic. After an initial section dealing with the concepts of power,
law, other agencies of social control, justice, and the state, we are treated
to a discursive discussion of the mercurial substance of natural law; and
then, after a consideration of the various factors which enter into the shaping
of law, there is a concluding section on positivism in jurisprudence, in the
course of which the Realist movement in America (by which this reviewer
takes his stand) is duly castigated.
tPrincipal Attorney, Legislative Counsel's Office, United States Treasury Depart-
ment. The views set forth herein are entirely those of the author of this review and
in no way indicate the views of the Treasury Department.
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Continually Mr. Bodenheimer recurs to the insistence that since our rulers
are not perfect men "their powers to decide over the fate of their fellowmen
must be made subject to legal limitations" (p. 51). It is not because this
statement is essentially untrue that exception is taken to it, but because it
is so remote, unanchored, without referent, a mere say-thing. In terms of
the context and materials of his analysis, it would seem as though Mr. Boden-
heimer, like many another academical philosopher, were simply making this
declaration in the blue- as if he were writing it in smoke across the sky.
We know, however, that his contention does have some connection with
what is going on in the world. It relates to the framework of governments
like our own with a working tradition of civil liberties whereby the citizen
is safeguarded from arbitrary intrusions by government. Even when Mr.
Bodenheimer's sky-writing is thus practically oriented, however, there are
still two questions he should ask himself. "Legal limitations" set by whom?
And backed by what?
To ask the first question is to realize that Mr. Bodenheimer is reluctant
to face the inevitably human aspect of all legal activity, including restraint.
The "law" which Mr. Bodenheimer exalts is largely the behavior of certain
officials known as judges. And the real choice before us is: to what extent
do we want judicial overseers? "Legal limitations" as words-in-a-statute-
book are not self-executing. They have always been subject to judicial con-
struction, which, as any practicing lawyer will tell you, often means judicial
destruction.'
To ask the second question is to indicate, with Jhering, that a legal rule
without coercion is "a fire which does not burn, a light that does not shine."
We have only to consider the status of so-called international law to see the
unhappy validity of this contention. It follows that the dichotomy between
power and law must be abandoned for, unless legal sanctions are backed by
power, they are worthless in a showdown. It is silly to be a defender of
law against despotism, while failing to consider the arts of achieving and
maintaining power in the domestic as in the international struggle. Boden-
heimer's position would condemn us to an angelic ineffectuality based on
pious and earnest reiteration, as though of a liturgy, that law-with-restraints
is best, while (to borrow a phrase of Dewey's) "burly sinners rule the
world." He seeks to make a distinction between the concept of law to which
compulsive sanctions are not essential and a developed system of law which
must have coercive power. Such an attempted distinction serves only to
illustrate further the doctrinaire mode of thinking.
The notion that law can still today be discussed in disregard of the psy-
chology and individual characteristics of the persons involved is carried over
from the rulers to the ruled. We are told, in typically formalistic fashion,
that:
"The realization of justice demands that two situations in which
the relevant circumstances are the same should be handled in an
identical way." (p. 38).
1. See my discussion of the judge as prestidigitator and artist in CARDOZO AN !
FRONTIERS oF LEGAL. THINKING (1938).
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A father, he illustrates, who forbids his sons to climb a tree should punish
each of them in the same way for an infraction. It does not make any
relevant difference to our author that one son is rebelling against his father's
domination, while the other loves apples.
The authentic learning of Mr. Bodenheimer and his many confreres, who
have been driven to our shores, has put us under a perverse debt to Herr
Hitler. That learning should not be minimized but neither need our indebt-
edness impair straight-hitting criticism. My own feeling is that when Mr.
Bodenheimer's life in Germany has receded in time and his career as an
active lawyer in this country has progressed further, his vast and impressive
erudition will be saddled more usably. Perhaps in time Mlr. Bodenheimer
will also lose the somewhat morbid distrust of the capacities and motives of
men which this book displays, as well as distrust of the collective will of
the people which now seems to him non-existent except as "forcefully im-
posed upon the members of society from above" (p. 192). Such views are
understandable in the after-taste of his ex-country's bitter draught, but they
cannot. be universalized and made the foundation for a sound jurisprudence.
No one can deny that men in power who run riot are dangerous. But
the Realist's insistence is equally undeniable, that the law is administered
by human beings and that the record discloses their capacity to get around
rules on paper even in a "government of laws". Leeway to be arbitrary is
also leeway to be untechnical. The real job is to get able and trustworthy
men, and for jurisprudence to center more than heretofore in the human
techniques and potentialities of legal operations. Nothing can be gained by
sidestepping or sideswiping our inescapable dependence on human wisdom
and, along with it, human frailty. Nor can I see much point in pounding
away at certain ideals irrespective of their conditions of fulfillment. For an
infusion of our legal doings with the democratic impulse we cannot rely
solely or primarily on precepts or doctrines, legal or otherwise. They may
help a little but, in the last analysis, each of us must search and commit his
own soul; and as a nation we must be genuinely devoted to processes of
majority rule and minority protection, with a "stern, intractable sense of
that which no man can stomach and still be free."
BERYL HARoLD LEvYt
SKELETON oF JUsTIcE. By Edith Roper and Clara Leiser. New York: E. P.
Dutton & Co., Inc., 1941. Pp. 346. $3.00
So basic to our form of government as to be commonplace is the concept
of "Justice for all." It is therefore particularly shocking to read a first-hand
account of the "administration of justice" in Germany today, an account
which demonstrates the fact that the brutal disregard of human rights
characteristic of the Nazis has permeated even so far as the courts. Retain-
ing in part the skeleton of a judicial system once intended to serve no special
interests, the Nazis have transformed the courts into instruments for politi-
" 'Member of the New York Bar.
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cal oppression, substituting new concepts to control private rights in accord-
ance with the Nazi creed.
Early in its assumption of power, the National Socialist Party became
shrewdly aware that it was best to resort to established legal means when-
ever possible. This, the Party reasoned, would satisfy the average German's
passion for order and legality, at the same time providing an effective method
for the liquidation of many troublesome problems. Hence, the regular courts
were utilized in the fight against the Catholics. Sensationally publicized
trials involving charges of depravity against nuns and monks were insti-
gated; witnesses were procured to present trumped-up evidence in these
trials. Nevertheless, the conduct of the trials was given the appearance
of objectivity; the procedural formulae were followed to the letter. But
the intense newspaper campaign eventually had the desired effect of arousing
a believing public to indignation against this source of opposition to the
government.
Ordinarily press passes in Germany are limited to journalists "of proved
political reliability" and anything to be published is carefully examined and
"corrected" or censored with an eye to its value as propaganda. Of course
the authorities ban reference to any undesirable information which might
encourage anti-National Socialist thought. The resultant unreliability of
newspaper accounts of court matters in present-day Germany is apparent.
The standard of the bar and bench has also sadly deteriorated under the
watchful reign of National Socialism. The "best" lawyers are those who
stand high in party rank. Similarly, so long as a judge serves the interest
of the State, he may remain capricious and ignorant. The quality of the
criminal bench is especially bad. The authors have quoted in some detail
the reasons given by various judges for convicting defendants on trial before
them in particular cases. They reveal much stupid inconsistency and a
personally colored emphasis on insignificant circumstances. Opportunity for
an independent appraisal of the facts is precluded by the preliminary investi-
gation of the Gestapo whose findings in almost all instances are obviously
accepted by the judges as verity.
The book furnishes many other interesting details of a field of Nazi admin-
istration where precise information has been all too meagre in the past.
Edith Roper was one of the very few newspaper correspondents permitted
to attend trials and report court matters in Germany. She fortunately was
able to remove her files out of the country and with the collaboration of
Clara Leiser wrote the book under review. It is perhaps regrettable that
Mrs. Roper did not have a more thorough working knowledge of judicial
processes in general, and some technical understanding of legal concepts.
Her critical evaluation of a number of court matters she witnessed suffers
accordingly. Both layman and lawyer, however, will find in Skeleton of
Justice further factual basis for provocative thought concerning the Nazi
tyranny which threatens the world.
JEROME S. ZURKOWt
tMernber of the New York Bar.
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